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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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This paper shows that the institutional environment and 
the ability to export on time are sources of comparative 
advantage as important as factors of production. In 
particular, the ability to export on time is crucial to 
explain comparative advantage in intermediate goods. 
These findings underscore the importance of investing 
This paper—a product of the International Trade Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network in 
collaboration with the World Trade Organization and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development—is 
part of a larger effort in the department to understand the determinants of trade in intermediate goods. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at egamberoni@
worldbank.org, Roberta.Piermartini@wto.org, rainer.lanz@oecd.org.
in infrastructure and fostering trade facilitation to 
boost a country’s participation in production networks. 
Furthermore, the paper contributes to the so-called 
“distance puzzle” by showing that the increasing 
importance of distance over time is in part driven by 
trade in intermediate goods.  
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I.  Introduction 
Trade in intermediate goods dominates trade flows, constituting about 60 percent of world exports. This 
aggregate figure hides, however, significant differences across countries and products. For example, while 
Chile’s exports of intermediate goods amount to 80 percent of  its total exports, for China this figure is only 
35 percent. Countries also vary significantly in their share of intermediate exports within a sector. For 
example, in the office machinery sector, over 70 percent of Australian exports are intermediate products, 
whereas 40 percent of US exports and only around 10 percent of Chilean and Chinese exports are 
intermediate goods.
2 
These data suggest that understanding the determinants of trade in intermediate goods is crucial to 
comprehend the patterns of trade. Despite the growing importance of international production networks in 
the world economy and a growing body of theoretical literature on fragmetation of production, to our 
knowledge, existing empirical literature has not studied what factors explain the different patterns of trade 
between intermediate and final goods. This paper fills this gap. 
Economic analysis has stressed two factors of comparative advantage to explain the specificities of trade in 
intermediate goods: a country's ability to enforce contracts and its ability to export on time. The ability to 
enforce a contract matters as a determinant of comparative advantage in trade of intermediate goods because, 
by mitigating the so-called "hold-up" problem
3, it affects the costs of producing a customized good. 
Intuitively, if the production of an intermediate good requires specific investments to customize the input to 
the production of the final good, the value of the input is lower outside the specific relationship supplier-
buyer than inside this relationship. Therefore, there is an incentive for the supplier to under-invest ex ante 
and to produce a lower quality good. Since this incentive is lower for suppliers located in countries with 
better contract enforcement, these countries will have an advantage in producing customized intermediate 
goods (Levchenko, 2007; Antràs, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2007; Costinot, 2005).
4  The importance of 
organizing and locating prodution in a way that ensures the timely delivery of parts and components also 
matters. According to the literature, timeliness matters for trade in intermediate goods as it is essential to the 
management of the production chain (Nordas, 2007).  Delays in delivery increase the cost of holding stocks, 
                                                      
2 Figures A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix illustrate this phenomenon for a selected number of countries.  
3 See Williamson (1985), Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) for seminal contributions. 
4 Another branch of the literature has focussed on the importance of the ability to enforce contracts for the share of 
intra-firm trade. See, for example, the theoretical models developed by Antras (2003), Antras and Helpman (2004), and 
Grossman and Helpman (2005) and the empirical studies on the determinants of the share of intra-firm trade by Bernard 
et al. (2010), Nunn and Trefler (2008), and Corcos et al. (2009).    3
impede rapid responses to changes in customers oders and limit the ability to rapidly detect, fix and replace 
defective components. Focusing on these costs, Harrigan and Venables (2004) show that the demand for 
timeliness in delivery generates incentives for the clustering of plants around the assembler or retailer.    
Guided by this literature, we test whether countries’ ability to enforce contracts and their ability to export on 
time play a different role in trade of intermediate and in that of final goods.  If production occurs as a 
sequence of tasks and various inputs are all essential to the production of the final good, an input that is not 
of the required quality (because of the underinvestment due to the hold-up problem) or is missing at the time 
when it is required (because of export delays) may nullify the value of all other inputs/tasks. Therefore, no 
discount can compensate the producer of the final good for the unreliable delivery (Kremer, 1993). In 
contrast, when a good is imported for final consumption, it is plausible that the consumer may accept to buy 
it for a reduced price even if it is of a lower quality than required or if it is delivered with a delay.  For 
example, while a car manufacturer will not be willing to use  a cheap radio in a luxurious car, a consumer 
that has ordered an expensive radio may compromise on the quality if he gets an adequate discount. 
Our empirical strategy consists in estimating a factor content model of trade.  In this model, the ability to 
enforce contracts and to export on time is assumed to determine a country's pattern of trade according to its 
comparative advantage rather than its trade volume.  Hence, we test whether countries with better ability to 
enforce contracts (export on time) export relatively more institutional-intensive (time-sensitive) goods. In 
particular, using the UN Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification to categorize goods according to 
their main end use
5, we test whether a country's ability to enforce a contract and its ability to export on time 
are more important determinants of comparative advantage in intermediate goods than in final goods.  
Our paper adds to the existing literature by testing whether the hold-up problem and time matter for the 
patterns of trade in intermediate goods. Although the theoretical literature defines the hold-up problem with 
respect to intermediate inputs, previous studies assessing the role of the quality of institutions as a 
determinant of trade patterns have focused on trade in final goods (which are produced using intensively 
intermediate goods) rather than on trade in intermediate goods themselves (Nunn, 2007; Levchenko, 2007).
6  
Similarly, while the importance of timely delivery has been stressed in particular in relation to production 
                                                      
5 Recently, other studies have used the BEC classification to study the patterns of trade in intermediate goods 
(Bergstrand and Egger, 2010; Miroudot et al., 2009). Our approach, however, is conceptually different from these 
studies, as they use the gravity model to study the volume of trade, while we focus on the factor content methodology to 
determine the sectoral pattern of trade. 
6 Institutional differences are found to be an important determinant of trade flows in a number of recent studies that use 
the gravity model of trade. For example, Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) and de Groot et al. (2004) show that quality 
of institutions significantly affects bilateral trade volumes and that better institutions are associated with higher volumes 
of trade. These models however do not look at institutions as factors affecting comparative advantage.   4
networks, there is no study to our knowledge that estimats the importance of time for trade in intermediate 
goods.
7   
Our results suggest that the ability to enforce contracts and timeliness are as important as traditional factors 
of comparative advantage for trade in intermediate goods. The ability to deliver on time, in particular, 
appears as the major factor in explaining the differences in trade patterns between trade in intermediate and 
final goods. These results are robust to the use of alternative measures of a country's quality of institutions 
and its ability to deliver on time as well as instrumental variable estimates. 
Finally, we further test the importance of time for trade in intermediate goods using a gravity model over the 
period 1980-2010.  If time particularly matters for trade in intermediate goods, the distance coefficient of a 
standard gravity regression should be higher for trade in intermediate goods than for total trade. The results 
of our gravity model estimation support this prediction.  We interpret this finding in the light of the so-called 
“distance puzzle” (Brun et al. 2005; Coe et al. 2007; Melitz, 2007; Disdier and Head, 2008) - that is the 
typical finding of gravity models that the elasticity of trade flows to distance has been rising over time. We 
show that the distance coefficient for trade in intermediate goods is higher and increases faster than that for 
total trade. This supports the view that the distance-puzzle can, to a certain extent, be explained by the 
growing phenomenon of vertical specialisation and just-in-time production.  
Our findings have important policy implications. They suggest that improving institutions, investing in 
infrastructure, and fostering trade facilitation would significantly boost a country's participation –especially a 
developing country’s participation- in production networks. 
To develop these arguments, section II presents the empirical specification and discusses our methodological 
approach. Section III describes the data and provides summary statistics. In section IV we present and 
discuss our main results and robustness checks. Section V derives some implications in terms of the so-called 
distance puzzle. Finally, section VI concludes. 
II.  Methodological Approach 
We analyze the role that a country's ability to enforce contracts and its ability to export on time have in 
determining trade patterns using a factor content methodology. A similar approach has been used by Romalis 
(2004) to assess the importance of traditional factor endowments (capital and labor) as sources of 
                                                      
7 Time has been found an important determinant of trade in a number of recent papers, such as Hummels (2001), 
Hausman et al. (2005), Evans and Harrigan (2005), Portugal-Perez and Wilson (2009), Djankov, Freund and Pham 
(2010), and Freund and Rocha (2010). These papers, however, do not look at the role of time in trade in intermediate 
goods.   5
comparative advantage, by Nunn (2007) and Levchenko (2007) to estimate  the role of institutions, and by 
Djankov, Freund and Pham (2010) and Li and Wilson (2009) to assess the role of time delays. In particular, 
we adopt the following empirical specification: 
  ij j i i j i j i j i j ij T t Q q H h K k X                 4 3 2 1 0    (1) 
where  ij X  is the logarithm of exports of country i to the world in the 6-digit NAICS industry j  in the year 
2000. Equation (1) is run for different types of goods, that is for the exports of intermediate goods, 
consumption goods or total trade.  
All explanatory variables take the form of interactions between industry intensities and country endowments 
which are denoted in lower case and upper case letters, respectively. The interaction terms allow testing 
whether countries export relatively more in industries that intensively use their abundant production factors. 
The four variables of interest are the interaction term between a product's contract-intensity and a country's 
ability to enforce a contract ( i jQ q ), the interaction term between a product's time-sensitivity and a country's 
ability to export on time ( i jT t ), as well as the traditional comparative advantage variables, i.e. the interaction 
terms between a product capital-intensity and a country's capital endowment ( i jK k ) and that between a 
product skill labor intensity and a country's human capital endowment ( i jH h ). The set of dummies  i   and 
j   control for country- and industry-specific fixed effects, respectively. We are most interested in the 
coefficients β3 and β4, especially for trade in intermediate goods. A positive sign of these coefficients will 
denote that countries with better contract enforcement environment capture a higher share of trade in 
institutional-intensive intermediate goods and that countries with better ability to export on time will capture 
a higher share of time-sensitive intermediate goods.  
In particular, we test the hypothesis that a country's ability to enforce contracts (that we measure with various 
indexes of the quality of institutions) and its ability to export on time (that we measure with various indexes 
of the quality of transport infrastructure) may be more important factors in determining the comparative 
advantage of trade in intermediate than in final goods. To test this hyphotesis, we pool all observations 
across different types of exported good and estimate the following equation:  
ijg j i g i j i j g i j i j i j i j ijg I T t T t I Q q Q q H h K k X                     6 5 4 3 2 1 0  (2) 
where  ijg X are pooled exports with g denoting either exports of intermediate goods or exports of 
consumption (final) goods. To test whether comparative advantage patterns are significantly different for 
intermediate goods, we interact the interaction term for quality of institutions and that for the export   6
timeliness variable with a dummy  g I  that equals 1 if  ijg X are exports of intermediate goods and 0 otherwise. 
In creating these interaction terms we center the variables at the sample mean in order to facilitate the 
interpretation of results.  We run equation (2) twice: in the first case, we pool the exports of intermediate and 
consumption goods, and in the second case, we pool the exports of intermediate and all other goods 
(consumption and capital goods). We are most interested in the coefficients β4 and β6. A positive estimate of 
these parameters would provide evidence consistent with the general assumption of theoretical models of 
trade that the hold up problem and timeliness are particularly important as a source of comparative advantage 
in intermediate goods than in consumption goods.  
We address potential endogeneity problems arising from omitted variables problems or from reverse 
causality. A concern is, for example, that trade (specialization) in institutional-intensive sectors could 
stimulate institutional reforms or that trade in time-sensitive sectors could foster investments in transport 
infrastructure. To address these issues, first, we adopt a factor content methodology that, as noted in 
Djankov, Freund and Pham (2010), presents the advantage that it minimizes identification problems.   
Second, we use country and industry fixed effects in all regressions to minimize omitted variable bias. Third, 
we also use instrumental variables (IV) estimations. In particular, we use the legal origin of a country’s legal 
system as an instrument for quality of institutions, and, focusing on a subsample of  landlocked countries, we 
use the average quality of infrastructure of its neighboring countries as an instrument for the quality of 
infrastructure of each landlocked country. The results of instrumental variables regressions and other 
robustness checks are presented in section IV.  
III.  Data Sources and Variable Definitions 
Data on trade flows, factor endowments and factor intensity are from standard sources.  The year under 
consideration is 2000. Exports data at the SITC Rev. 3 5-digit level are from the OECD/UN International 
Trade Commodity Statistics (ITCS) database. We use the UN Broad Economic Categories (BEC) 
classification to define intermediate goods. We then map these data to  6-digit NAICS 1997 industries using 
the correspondence table from Feenstra et al. (2002). The BEC classification groups products into four 
categories of goods according to their main end use, i.e. intermediate, consumption, capital goods and not 
classified goods.
8  The world share of trade in terms of these four categories is reported in Table 1. As shown 
in the table, intermediate goods are the most important component of world trade both in terms of volumes 
and number of products.  
                                                      
8 This residual category includes for example passenger motor vehicles. Passenger motor vehicles are not classified by 
BEC because they are used as capital goods when purchased by a company to run its businesses, whereas they are used 
as consumption goods when bought by private households.   7
Table 1:  World trade by end use, 2000 
 
  
Number of SITC  
Rev.3 lines 




Total 3,053  5,900,952.0  100.0% 
Intermediate 1,873  3,397,270.5  57.6% 
Consumption 698  1,096,182.5  18.6% 
Capital 468  1,082,342.4  18.3% 
Not classified  14  325,156.7  5.5% 
      Source:  Authors calculations based on ITCS database. 
Capital intensity,  j k , and skilled labor intensity, j h , of 6-digit NAICS industries in the year 2000 are taken 
from the U.S. NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. They are measured as the natural logarithm of 
the total real capital stock per worker in industry  j, and the share of non-production workers in total 
employment of industry  j, respectively. We measure institutional intensity  j q  of industry  j as the share of 
products in the industry that are neither reference priced nor sold on an organized exchange. To construct 
this variable we use the Rauch (1999)’s classification, which groups goods into goods traded on an organized 
exchange, reference priced goods and non-reference priced goods.  The assumption is that the production of 
non-reference priced goods requires a relatively high level of relation-specific investments so that these 
goods are more subject to the hold-up problem than goods sold on an organized exchage or reference priced 
goods.  As suggested by Nunn (2007), the fact that a good is traded on an organized exchange indicates that 
its market is thick, hence there is limited scope for the hold-up problem to emerge. Similarly, the fact that a 
good is reference priced in a publication may be thought of as an indication that there is a reasonable number 
of potential buyers and sellers of that good,limiting potential hold-up problems. Following Hummels (2001), 
we define time-sensitive products according to their probability of being transported by air. We measure 
timeliness  j t  of industry  j as the share of US imports shipped by air.  Data on US imports and shipping 
mode at the HS10 digit level are collected by the U.S. Census Bureau and are taken from the homepage of 
Peter Schott. We use the HS10 to NAICS 1997 correspondence table from Feenstra et al. (2002) to calculate 
timeliness at the NAICS industry level. Since both institutional intensity  j q  and timeliness  j t  are based on 
product level data, we can use the BEC classification to calculate intensities for intermediate and other types 
of goods that belong to the same NAICS industry.  
Country endowments of capital  i K  and human capital  i H  are measured by the natural logarithm of capital 
stock per worker and the logarithm of human capital per worker for the year 1988 taken from Hall and Jones   8
(1999).
9 In our benchmark specification, a country’s quality of institutions  i Q  is measured by the "rule of 
law index" from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (2009).In the robustness checks, we also 
use the time and the cost to enforce contracts
10 from the World Bank Doing Business Indicators as 
alternative measures for the quality of institutions.A country’s ability to export timely is measured by the 
quality of transport infrastructure  i T  as captured by the infrastructure component of the World Bank 
Logistics Performance Index.
11 Quality of infrastructure matters because it is an important determinant of the 
length of time to export and of the certainty of delivery, beyond being an important determinant of the 
financial dimension of trade costs. As additional measures for a country’s ability to deliver on time, we use 
the time to export from World Bank Doing Business Indicators
12 and an index of the quality of transport 
infrastructure constructed as in Limão and Venables (2001). The latter is calculated as the average of the 
deviations from the sample mean of four variables: (i) the percentage of paved road; (ii) the density of the 
rail network, both taken from the World Development Indicators 2008; (iii) the number of airports with 
paved runways over 3,047 meters – obtained from the CIA Factbook; and (iv) a port efficiency index 
(ranging between 1 and 10) taken from the IMD World Competitiveness year book. 
Summary statistics of factor endowments and factor intensities are provided in Tables 2 and 3. These 
statistics show that timeliness and institutional intensity are on average higher for intermediate than for 
consumption goods. In particular, 22 percent of U.S. intermediate imports are shipped by air compared to 18 
percent of consumption goods, and 65 percent of intermediate goods are not reference priced products 
compared to an average of 78 percent in the case of consumption goods. In addition, table 4 shows the 
correlation between factor intensities and the share of intermediate goods in industry exports. This 
correlation is positive and significant for capital intensity, not significant for skilled labor intensity, and 
negative and significant for both institutional intensity and timeliness. 
                                                      
9 The data is accessible at http://www.stanford.edu/%7Echadj/HallJones400.asc and a number of studies have used the 
same database. These include Romalis (2004), Levchenko (2007) and Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2010). 
10 Indicators on enforcing contracts measure the efficiency of the judicial system in resolving a commercial dispute. 
Time is recorded in calendar days. Cost is recorded as a percentage of the claim, assumed to be equivalent to 200% of 
income per capita.  
11 This index is based on a worldwide survey of operators on the ground (global freight forwarders and express carriers) 
and it captures the quality of trade and transport related infrastructure (e.g. ports, railroads, roads, information 
technology). 
12 Time to export is recorded in calendar days and measures the time required to compile all procedures required for 
exporting.  
   9
Table 2:  Summary statistics of country endowments 
 
   Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Rule  of  Law  103  2.650 1.002 1.043 4.425 
ln(K/L)  103  9.422 1.504 5.763  11.589 
ln(H/L)  103  0.613 0.291 0.072 1.215 
LPI  Infrastructure  95  2.779 0.746 1.400 4.290 
LPI  Timeliness  95  3.340 0.651 2.000 4.530 
 
 
Table 3:  Summary statistics of industry intensities 
 
   Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
capital intensity  360  11.491  0.879  9.547  14.299 
skilled labor  intensity  360  0.286  0.114  0.087  0.682 
institutional  intensity  intermediate  241  0.649  0.433 0 1 
institutional intensity consumption  136 0.778 0.403 0  1 
institutional intensity capital goods  89  0.966  0.169  0  1 
timeliness intermediate goods  265  0.217  0.217  0  0.901 
timeliness consumption goods  142  0.187  0.212  0  0.968 
 
 
Table 4:  Pairwise correlations between industry intensities and the 





capital int.  0.343* 
skilled labor int.   -0.080 
institutional int. interm.  -0.199* 
timeliness interm.  -0.311* 
Note:  * denotes significant at 5%   
 
IV.  Results 
A.  Comparative Advantage in Intermediate and Final Goods Trade 
Table 5 reports the OLS estimations of equation (1) for three sets of regressions. Columns A.1-A.3 show the 
results of the regression for total trade, columns B.1-B.3 report the results for trade in intermediate goods, 
and columns C.1-C.3 provide the results for trade in consumption goods. All regressions control for the 
traditional factors of comparative advantage: capital and skilled labor. For each dependent variable, we 
provide in the first column the estimates for the traditional sources of comparative advantage adding only the   10
interaction term for institutional quality, in the second column we add the interaction term for timely delivery 
and in the third column we simultaneously control for all the traditional and new sources of comparative 
advantage as specified in equation (1). All coefficients are beta standardized so that their size can be 
compared. 
In line with existing literature, we find that the quality of institution is an important determinant of total trade 
patterns (Set A). That is, countries with good rule of law specialize in institutional-intensive industries. 
Similarly, when we include the interaction term for timely delivery, we find that countries with high quality 
of infrastructure have a comparative advantage in time-sensitive industries.  
Comparing the magnitude of the effects of the different interaction terms, we find that quality of institutions 
and quality of infrastructure together are approximately as important as traditional sources of comparative 
advantage (capital and labor) in explaining the patterns of trade.  For example, in the case of intermediate 
goods a simultaneous one standard deviation increase in the interaction terms for institution and 
infrastructure quality increases the dependent variable by .45 standard deviations. A similar effect is 
generated by a simultaneous one standard deviation increase in the capital and skilled labor interactions.  
The importance of the quality of institutions and timely delivery in explaining trade patterns is also 
confirmed when we run the regression separately for intermediate and consumption goods. Interestingly, 
while the impact of institutional quality is similar for the exports of intermediates (columns B.1-B.3) and of 
consumption goods (columns C.1-C.3), timely delivery is found to be particularly important for exports of 
intermediate goods.  This relationship is also economically significant. For example, estimates from Table 5 
predict that if Thailand improved its infrastructure to equal Chinese Thaipei, then its exports of "office 
machinery" would increase significantly more for intermediate goods (by 26%
13) than for consumption 
goods (by 5%). In contrast, if Thailand improved its contract enforcement environment to the level of 
Chinese Thaipei, then its exports of "office machinery" would increase by approximately the same 
percentage in intermediate and consumption goods (28 and 32 per cent, respectively). 
                                                      
13 This is calculated as follows. Thailand's quality of infrastructure index (T) is 3.16 and Chinese Thaipei's is 3.62. 
Office machinery time-sensititvity (t) is 0.319. Thailand's initial value of exports of intermediate office machinery 
goods is US$ 5.06 billion. The beta coefficient of 0.244 β4 corresponds to a coefficient of 1.552. If Thailand improved 
its quality of infrastructure to equal Chines Thaipei, then its exports of intermediate office machinery goods would be 
given by: lnXij= ln 5.06+ β4tj ΔT=ln 5.06+ 1.552*0.319*0.46. Solving yields a figure of US$6.36 billion.       11







trade Intermediate  Intermediate Intermediate Consumption  Consumption  Consumption 
    A.1 A.2 A.3  B.1  B.2  B.3  C.1  C.2  C.3 
qxQ  
(institutions)  0.187***   0.163*** 0.247***   0.207*** 0.226***   0.236*** 
  (14.318)   (12.081) (15.820)    (12.621)  (9.878)    (10.036) 
txT  
(infrastructure)    0.225***  0.184***      0.303*** 0.244***   0.077***  0.047** 
   (16.186)  (12.910)      (16.947)  (12.443)   (3.274)  (1.998) 
kxK  (capital)  0.247*** 0.102*  0.372*** 0.245***  -0.002  0.371***  0.180*  -0.106  0.223** 
  (4.136) (1.842) (5.984) (3.341) (-0.033)  (4.887) (1.871) (-1.156)  (2.161) 
hxH (human 
capital)  0.096***  0.057***  0.048***  0.144*** 0.089*** 0.077*** 0.016  0.041*  0.017 
  (9.036) (4.819) (4.052) (10.120) (5.904)  (4.853)  (0.770) (1.888)  (0.753) 
Country fixed 
effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.752 0.752 0.754 0.748  0.75  0.75  0.722  0.716  0.72 
Number of
observations  29,126 28,343 27,153 18,993  19,600  17,838  11,252  10,971  10,414 
Number of 
countries  103  95 95 103  95  95  103  95  95 
Number of 
industries  343 359 342 241  265  241  136  142  135 
Notes:  The dependent variable is the natural log of exports in industry k by country i to the World. Coefficients are beta standardized 
and t-values for robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  * Significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. 
 
Next, we test whether there are significant differences in the sources of comparative advantage between 
intermediate and final goods by estimating equation (2). Table 6 reports the results of the OLS regressions. 
Columns A.1-A.3 report the results when intermediate exports and all other types of exports
14 are pooled, 
while columns B.1-B.3 show the results when intermediate exports are pooled with only consumption 
exports.  
Interestingly, we find that while the interaction term between the intermediate good dummy and the quality 
of institutions is not significant, the one between the intermediate good dummy and the quality of 
infrastructure is higly significant.  In other words, our results indicate that institutions matter in the same 
manner for both trade in intermediate and consumption goods.  In contrast, quality of infrastructure is more 
important as a factor of comparative advantage in trade of intermediate goods than in trade of final goods.  
                                                      
14 This is the sum of consumption goods exports, capital goods exports and exports of goods which are not classified by 
BEC.    12
As shown in Columns A.3 and B.3, these results remain robust to the inclusion of the interaction terms 
between the intermediate good dummy and the interaction terms related to capital and human capital.  
These results are surprisingly at odds with the emphasis given by recent trade theory to the international 
hold-up problem as a determiniant of offshoring at least as to the choice of where to offshore is concerned.  
Rather, they support the view of Harrigan and Venables (2004), who suggest that timeliness is crucial for the 
integration of countries into global production networks while it is less important for serving final 
consumers.    13
Table 6:  Testing for differences in the determinants of comparative advantage 
   Intermediate versus all other exports  Intermediate versus consumption exports 
    A.1 A.2 A.3 B.1 B.2  B.3 
qxQ    (institutions)  0.060*** 0.063*** 0.055*** 0.064*** 0.069*** 0.065*** 
  (15.465) (10.175) (8.683) (15.098)  (9.710) (8.765) 
qxQxI   -0.005 0.005 -0.008  -0.003 
   (-0.902)  (0.790)     (-1.198)  (-0.422) 
txT    (infrastructure)  0.043*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.045*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (12.480)  (7.028)  (5.987)  (11.706) (2.791)  (2.738) 
txTxI    0.013*** 0.017***     0.037*** 0.036*** 
   (2.756) (3.402) (6.018)  (5.518)
kxK  (capital)  0.019*** 0.018*** -0.001  0.026*** 0.026*** 0.018** 
 (4.726)  (4.652)  (-0.114) (5.972)  (5.953) (2.445) 
kxKxI    0.026***       0.011 
    (4.233)       (1.604) 
hxH (human capital)  0.017***  0.017*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.016***  0.009 
 (5.194)  (5.255)  (4.941) (4.724) (4.299) (1.383) 
hxHxI    -0.005       0.009 
    (-1.238)       (1.369) 
I (intermediate dummy)  -0.076***  -0.077***  -0.076***  -0.01  -0.011*  -0.011* 
  (-15.832) (-15.875) (-15.855)  (-1.627) (-1.659) (-1.663) 
           
Country  fixed  effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  fixed  effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared  0.709 0.709 0.709 0.691 0.691 0.691 
Number  of  observations 33,743 33,743 33,743 28,252 28,252 28,252 
Number  of  countries 95 95 95 95 95 95 
Number  of  industries 342 342 342 309 309 309 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of intermediate or all other (consumption) exports in industry k by country i to the 
World. Coefficients are beta standardized and t-values for robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  * Significant at 10%; ** at 
5%; *** at 1%. 
 
B.  Robustness Checks  
As a first test for the robustness of the results, we estimate equation (2) using alternative measures for the 
quality of the institutional environment and the ability to deliver in time. Results are reported in Table 7.  We 
consistently find that the ability to deliver on time is a significant determinant of comparative advantage also 
when it is measured by the days required to export (columns A.1 and B.1) or by the index of transport 
infrastructure – calculated as an average of the quality of rail, road, air and port infrastructure (columns A.2 
and B.2).  We also find that the coefficients for the quality of institution is significant and of the expected 
sign also when the quality of institutions is proxied by the time and the cost required to enforce a contract   14
(columns A.3-A.4 and B.3-A.4). Note that since we expect that lengthy times and high costs denote scarse 
ability to enforce contracts, a negative coefficient on these variables denote that countries with better 
enforceability conditions have a comparative advantage in institutional intensive goods. 
The results also confirm that timeliness rather than institutional quality is the most important factor in 
explaining the different patterns of comparative advantage in  intermediate rather than in  final goods. For all 
the measures used to proxy a country's ability to deliver on time, the interaction term with the dummy for 
intermediate goods is significant and of the same sign as the term denoting the comparative advantage in 
time sensitive goods per se. In contrast, the interaction of the intermediate good dummy with the variable 
that proxies a comparative advantage in institutional intensive goods is either not significant or takes the 
opposite sign of the related comparative advantage terms.     15
Table 7:  Robustness check using alternative measures of country endowments 
   Intermediate versus all other exports  Intermediate versus consumption exports 
   A.1  A.2  A.3  A.4  B.1  B.2  B.3  B.4 
qxQ  (institutions)  0.061***  0.058***        0.066***  0.061***     
 (10.131)  (9.842)      (9.500)  (9.059)     
qxQxI -0.005  -0.002 -0.005 -0.001   
  (-0.780) (-0.354)      (-0.831)  (-0.170)    
qxQ1  (time to enforce 
contract)     -0.025***          -0.021***   
     (-4.397) (-3.297)
qxQ1xI     0.005          0.001   
     (0.838)          (0.122)   
qxQ2 (cost to enforce 
contract)     -0.039***   -0.051***
       (-6.270)       (-7.008) 
qxQ2xI       0.008       0.016** 
       (1.368)       (2.327) 
txT  (infrastructure)      0.036***  0.036***       0.022***  0.020*** 
     (7.350) (7.356) (3.312) (3.059)
txTxI     0.019***  0.019***        0.041***  0.043*** 
     (4.122)  (4.138)       (6.521)  (6.797) 
txT1 (time to export)  -0.035***        -0.019***       
  (-7.730)        (-3.123)     
txT1xI  -0.007        -0.027***     
  (-1.591)        (-4.356)     
txT2  (road,rail,port,air)    0.039***         0.032***     
   (8.863)          (5.120)     
txT2xI   0.011**          0.022***     
   (2.305)          (3.615)     
kxK (capital)  0.017***  0.015***  -0.001  0.004  0.025***  0.023***  0.005  0.012*** 
 (4.497)  (4.089)  (-0.239) (1.109)  (5.738) (5.379) (1.257) (2.939) 
hxH  (human  capital)  0.017*** 0.019***  0.022***  0.020***  0.016***  0.019*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 
 (5.247)  (6.415)  (6.544) (6.121) (4.538) (5.384)  (5.199) (4.859)
I (intermediate dummy)  -0.078***  -0.081***  -0.075***  -0.075***  -0.014**  -0.016***  -0.01  -0.01 
 (-16.464)  (-17.295)  (-15.481)  (-15.487) (-2.277)  (-2.588) (-1.555) (-1.554) 
               
Country  effects  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry  effects  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.712  0.711  0.708  0.708  0.695  0.694  0.69  0.691 
Number of observations  34,868  36,023  33,352  33,352  29,196  30,158  27,925  27,925 
Number of countries  99  102  93  93  99  102  93  93 
Number  of  industries  342 342  342  342  309  309 309 309 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of intermediate or all other (consumption) exports in industry k by country i to the World. 
Coefficients are beta standardized and t-values for robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  * Significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.  16
As a further robustness check, we run the regressions for the subsample of “homogeneous” industries, i.e. 
industries which produce either only intermediate or only consumption goods. The rationale for this 
additional test is the following: While industry intensities related to institutions and timeliness are broken 
down by BEC categories because they are based on product information, this is not possible for capital and 
skilled labor intensities. Hence, if an industry consists of intermediate and consumption goods, we have to 
assume that all goods in this industry are produced using the same capital and skilled labor intensity. To 
address this shortcoming, we rerun our main regressions for a set of homogenous industries consisting of 
either only intermediate or only consumption goods. By focusing on the subsample of “intermediate goods-
only” and “consumption goods-only” industries, we can ensure that the measure of capital and labor intensity 
we use are industry specific to the good they refer to. The results of these regressions (reported in Table 8) 
support our previous findings: timeliness in exporting has a larger impact on the export pattern of 
intermediate goods (columns B.1 and B.2). Furthermore, for this subsample we also find that quality of 
institutions increases exports of institution-intensive sectors more for intermediate than for final goods.    17
Table 8:  Robustness check on "homogeneous" industries 
   Separate Regressions  Pooled Regressions 
   Intermediate  Consumption  Intermediate versus Consumption 
   A.1  A.2  B.1  B.2 
qxQ  (institutions)  0.137***  0.092***  0.019**  0.022** 
 (6.655)  (2.586)  (1.986)  (2.248) 
qxQxI     0.022**  0.018* 
     (2.413)  (1.828) 
txT  (infrastructure)  0.190***  0.056*  0.025***  0.029*** 
 (7.431)  (1.743)  (3.411)  (3.834) 
txTxI     0.022***  0.017** 
     (2.990)  (2.236) 
kxK (capital)  0.364***  0.491***  0.037***  0.047*** 
 (3.498)  (3.409)  (6.763)  (5.170) 
kxKxI         -0.012 
         (-1.300) 
hxH (human capital)  0.055***  -0.091***  0.007*  -0.001 
 (2.594)  (-3.097)  (1.682)  (-0.198) 
hxHxI         0.011* 
         (1.692) 
I (intermediate dummy)      -0.057***  -0.057*** 
     (-4.817)  (-4.814) 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.742  0.717  0.728  0.728 
Number of observations  10,197  4,924  16,889  16,889 
Number of countries  95  95  95  95 
Number of industries  134  62  205  205 
Notes: In separate regressions, the dependent variable is either the natural log of intermediate exports or of 
consumption exports. In pooled regressions, the dependent variable is the natural log of intermediate or consumption 
exports. Regressions are run only for homogeneous industries, i.e. industries exporting either only intermediate or 
only consumption goods. Coefficients are beta standardized and t-values for robust standard errors are reported in 
brackets.  * Significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. 
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Although, as discussed in section II, our methodological approach as well as the inclusion of country and 
industry fixed effect limit the scope for endogeneity, one must be cautious in interpreting the OLS estimate 
as causal.  It is in fact possible that the relationship between infrastructure and institutions on one side and 
trade on the other side is reversed. That is, countries that specialize in contract intensive (time sensitive) 
industries may have greater incentive to develop a good contract enforcement environment (good 
infrastructure). To address this endogeneity bias, we use instrumental variables regressions to estimate our 
model (1).   
In particular, to address the problem of a possible endogeneity of the quality of infrastructure, we follow 
Djankov, Freund and Pham (2010) and run the regressions for a subsample of landlocked countries using the 
average quality of infrastructure of neighboring countries as instrumental variables. The idea is that while 
exports of a landlocked county might affect its infrastructure, it will not affect the investment in 
infrastructure of its neighbors. However, the infrastructure quality of its neighbors will affect the landlocked 
country's  ability to export timely since exports will have to transit through at least one of its neighbors.  
Table 9 provides the results of the IV regressions obtained using the average quality of transport 
infrastructure of neighboring countries as instrument for the transport infrastructure of landlocked countries. 
Since we only focus on landlocked countries, the number of countries left in the regressions shrinks to 13.
 
Results confirm that if countries improve their infrastructure quality, they will indeed experience an increase 
in exports in time-sensitive sectors. In particular, quality of infrastructure is more important in determining 
comparative advanatage in intermediate goods than in final goods (where for this subsample they do not 
appear even to be sigificant).     19
Table 9:  Robustness to endogeneity of quality of infrastructure, 2SLS IV regressions 
          
   Total Trade  Intermediate  Consumption 
   First stage  Second Stage  First stage  Second Stage  First stage  Second Stage 
txT (infrastructure)     0.157***     0.201***     0.02 
      (4.652)     (4.095)     0.292 
qxQ (institutions)  0.054***  0.173*** 0.069*** 0.169*** 0.040**  0.211***
   (6.411)  (5.774)  (5.741)  (3.901)  (2.512)  3.545 
kxK (capital)  0.041  -0.108  0.074  -0.039  -0.078  -0.606** 
   (0.993)  (-0.747) (1.223) (-0.184) (-1.037)  -2.16
hxH (human capital)  0.046***  0  0.039***  0.02  0.022  -0.005 
   (5.518)  (0.014)  (2.966)  (0.419)  (1.352)  -0.093 
txIV (average 
neighboring countries T)  1.197***     1.183***     1.226***    
   (103.02)     (71.76)     (55.16)    
R-squared  0.983  0.772  0.985  0.77  0.986  0.762 
Number of observations  3249  3249  1603  1603  882  882 
Number of countries     13     13     13 
Number of industries     342     246     137 
Widstat     10612.605     5148.938     3042.99 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of exports in industry j by country i to the World. txT is instrumented using txIV 
where the instrument is the average infrastructure of neighboring countries. Reported are the beta standardized coefficients of the 
second stage IV regression with t-values shown in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. 
As far as potential endogeneity problems of the quality of institutions are concerned, we also estimate 
equation (1) using an instrumental variable approach. As an instrument for the quality of institution of a 
country we use the average quality of institution across all countries with its same legal origin.  In particular, 
we distinguish between British, French, German, Social or Scandinavian legal origin.  It makes intuitive 
sense to assume that the different legal origins of countries are reflected in today’s quality of institutions of 
countries, but that legal origins themselves are not affected by comparative advantage in 2000.   
Table 10 reports the results of these estimations. As shown, our instrument is significant and positive in the 
first stage regressions, thus supporting the view that legal origins do affect a country's present quality of 
institutions, and the coefficient for institutions as a source of comparative advanatage is positive and 
significant in the second stage regressions, thus showing that there is causal effect that runs from the quality 
of institutions to a country's specialization patterns. Furthermore, the comparison between the beta 
coefficients of the regressions for intermediate and consumption goods continue to support the view that 
while infrastructure are more important as a source of comparative advanatage in intermediate goods trade, 
institutional quality is not.    20
Table 10:  Robustness to endogeneity of quality of institutions, 2SLS IV regressions 
   Total Trade  Intermediate  Consumption 
   First stage  Second Stage  First stage  Second Stage  First stage  Second Stage 
qxQ (institutions)     0.247***     0.204***     0.358*** 
      (9.993)     (5.684)     6.976 
txT (infrastructure)  0.143***  0.167***  0.227***  0.205***  0.085***  -0.002 
   (23.481)  (11.514)  (25.084)  (8.943)  (7.288)  -0.063 
kxK (capital)  -1.347***  0.514***  -1.382***  0.437***  -1.255***  0.515*** 
   (-62.42)  (8.12)  (-44.20)  (4.738)  (-30.87)  4.097 
hxH (human capital)  0.045***  0.044***  0.006  0.085***  0.054***  -0.026 
   (8.796)  (3.764)  (0.744)  (4.694)  (5.52)  -1.113 
qxIV (quality of 
institutions by legal origin)  0.662***     0.638***     0.660***    
   (90.41)     (61.84)     (46.33)    
R-squared  0.951  0.753  0.95  0.745  0.951  0.716 
Number of observations  27153  27153  13749  13749  7322  7322 
Nunmber of countries     95     95     95 
Number of industries     342     241     135 
Widstat     8174.639     3823.676     2146.721 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of exports in industry k by country i to the World. qxQ is instrumented using qxIV  
where the instrument (IV) is a variable that assumes the value of the average quality of institution across all countries with the same 
legal origin. Reported are the beta standardized coefficients of the second stage IV regression with t-values shown in brackets. * 
Significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.    
 
V.  The Distance Puzzle Revisited 
Our finding that timeliness is particularly important as a determinant of trade in intermediate goods supports 
Harrigan and Venables (2004)'s view that fragmentation of production is a force of agglomeration and 
suggests that intermediate goods should be more sensitive to distance than final goods.  To support our 
findings, in this section we also assess whether these expectations hold true using an alternative 
methodological approach: the standard gravity model of bilateral trade flows.  In doing so, we also relate our 
results to the recent literature on the so-called "distance puzzle", that is the typical finding of gravity models 
that, contrary to expectations, the elasticity of trade flows to distance has been rising over time (Brun et al., 
2005; Coe et al., 2007; Melitz, 2007; Disdier and Head, 2008). A number of explanations have been 
proposed as a solution to the puzzle. Melitz (2007), for example, investigates the role that the composition of 
trade flows in terms of intra- and inter-industry trade may have played. Our finding that trade in intermediate 
goods are more time sensitive than trade in final goods points to an additional effect of the composition of 
trade on the distance coefficient. That is, can the growing importance of vertical specialization for trade help 
to explain the distance puzzle?  
Using a gravity model on bilateral trade flow in the period 1980-2010, we study the evolution of the distance 
coefficient for trade in intermediate goods and total trade. Figure 1 shows the results obtained on the basis of 
a standard gravity model equation estimated using exporter and importer time-varying fixed effects, distance   21
and a range of bilateral variables including: common language, common border, colonial links, whether a 
country is landlocked or an island as well as common currency dummy.  
The figure shows that in line with our previous finding that timeliness is more important for trade in 
intermediate than in final goods, the coefficient of distance for trade in intermediate goods is larger than that 
for the total trade over the whole period. In particular, we find that the coefficient of distance in trade in 
intermediate goods increases faster than that of total trade. This suggests that the composition of trade 
between trade in intermediate and final goods may partially explain the increase in the distance coefficient. 
Yet, rather than solving the puzzle, this result simply raises the question of why trade in intermediates is 
increasingly more time sensitive.  
This result supports the pessimistic interpretation of the recent finding by Carrère, de Melo and Wilson 
(2010: 32) that if “trade costs can be viewed as a growing impediment in the supply-chain production. Then, 
if low-income countries’ trade costs (in particular distance-dependant costs such as high mark-ups in 
international shipping) remain high compared to other developing countries’ trade costs, the observed 
regionalisation of trade could be interpreted as a marginalisation of these countries."  
 
Figure 1: The distance coefficient in total and intermediate goods trade,  gravity estimations
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Recent literature on production networks has emphasized the international hold-up problem and  the 
importance of a country’s ability to enforce a contract to explain the patterns of trade in general and of 
offshoring in particular. The relevance of the ability to deliver on time as a factor of comparative advantage 
has been studied empirically for total trade and highlighted for production networks mainly in the policy 
debate. This paper complements existing studies that show that the quality of institutions and of transport 
infrastructure provide a comparative advantage in exporting institution-intensive and time-sensitive goods, 
respectively.  
Moreover, we contribute to the literature by extending these results to trade in intermediate goods. We find 
that the hold-up problem and timeliness are important determinants of the patterns of trade for both final and 
intermediate goods. They together account for as much as traditional sources of comparative advantage, such 
as capital and labor.  Most importantly, we show that quality of transport infrastructure, i.e. the ability to 
export on time, rather than quality of institutions is particularly important to explain the difference between 
the pattern of trade in intermediate and that in final goods. For example, we estimate that if Thailand 
improved its infrastructure to equal Chinese Thaipei, then its exports of "office machinery" intermediate 
goods would increase by 26 percent while its exports of consumption products of the same sector would 
increase by 5 percent.   
We also contribute to the literature on the so-called "distance puzzle" by showing that part of the explanation 
for an increasing distance coefficient over time in the gravity model of trade is the increase over time in the 
time-sensitivity of trade in intermediate goods.   
These results have important policy implications as they emphasize the importance of timeliness for the just-
in-time needs of production networks and help explain why many countries are left out of these production 
networks. By providing a more detailed understanding of the role of institutions and transport infrastructure 
for comparative advantage patterns of trade, our results may also provide guidance in the evaluation of 
possible gains from "aid for trade" (an initiative launched at the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 
December 2005 targeted among other issues to developing infrastructure in developing countries) and "trade 
facilitations" (an area under negotiation in the ongoing Doha Round, that aims at the simplification of trade 
procedures as a way to facilitate trade).    23
Appendix 
Figure A.1: Share of intermediate goods in total exports 
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